Tulsa Law Review
Volume 47
Issue 3 State-Tribal Relations: Past, Present,
and Future
Spring 2012

Liberal Defaults: The Pending Perception of Special Financial
Rights among American Indian Nations
Raymond I. Orr

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Raymond I. Orr, Liberal Defaults: The Pending Perception of Special Financial Rights among American
Indian Nations, 47 Tulsa L. Rev. 515 (2013).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol47/iss3/2

This Native American Symposia Articles is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more
information, please contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu.
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LIBERAL DEFAULTS: THE PENDING PERCEPTION
OF "SPECIAL FINANCIAL RIGHTS" AMONG
AMERICAN INDIAN NATIONS

Raymond I. Orr, Ph.D*
INTRODUCTION

Chief Justice John Marshall noted that the "condition of the Indians in relation to
the United States is perhaps unlike that of any other two people in existence."I This
description, part of his 1831 decision in Cherokee Nation v. State of Georgia, is a now
well-worn passage in the annals of American Indian legal scholarship.2 A seminal
sentiment - and possibly emblematic - it describes the ambiguous relationship
between federal, state, and tribal governments. Both alone and in conjunction with
subsequent court decisions, Marshall's majority decision, has complicated as much as it
has clarified the unusual status of American Indian tribes in the American legal and
political system. 3 With Johnson v. M'Intosh4 and Worcester v. State of Georgia5 (the
other two decisions that comprise what is considered The Marshall Trilogy6), Cherokee
Nation v. State of Georgia7 proved indicative not only of future decisions on the status of
American Indians, but also of how such decisions could, on the one hand, illuminate
Indian Nations' rights in relation to outside governments and, on the other, muddle or
undermine that status.8
The place of indigenous communities (and individuals) - their rights, obligations,
entitlements, privileges, responsibilities, political position, and status in the larger system
- has been, as Marshall attested, "unlike that of any other two people." 9 Yet, the
tremendous flux surrounding this status and relationship complicates this uniqueness.10
* Lecturer of Politics and Indigenous Studies, School of the Social and Political Sciences, University of
Melbourne.
1. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (1 Pet.) 1, 16 (1831).
2. See id.
3. That Indian policy has changed over time is not a controversial or contested point. Numerous writers
have talked about various periods and inconsistency in Indian policy. An oft-cited text is FRANCIS PRUCHA,
INDIAN POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES: HISTORICAL ESSAYS (1981).

4. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
5. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (1 Pet.) 515 (1832), abrogatedby Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 361,
(2001).
6. Nathan Goetting, The MarshallTrilogy and the ConstitutionalDehumanizationofAmerican Indians, 65
GUILD PRAC. 207, 211 (2008).

7. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 1.
8. See Goetting, supranote 6.
9. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 16.
10. See PRUCHA, supra note 3.
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The peculiar relationship has multiple implications, not the least of which concerns how
American Indians confront the state. For example, political theorist Kevin Bruyneel
contends that indigenous Americans' struggle in petitioning the American government
results from their unique status.12 Bruyneel terms the irregular location of American
Indian politics as a "third space" - one that results from the idiosyncratic position
American Indians have in the larger United States political system. 13 For Bruyneel, this
"third space," neither spatial nor temporal, awkwardly exists somewhere between the
two. 14 At its broadest, this essay speculates on why certain types of events have the
potential to shape the unusual space that exists between American Indians and the federal
government.
More specific, however, this essay focuses on how the recent tribal defaults on
debts resulting from the 2008 global financial crisis (in conjunction with tribal overspending) might set into motion a process with implications for the status of tribes in the
American political system. In particular, this essay highlights the interplay between court
decisions and public opinion on this fiscal issue of bankruptcy and economic rights.
Although Native Nations' policy and status might change through multiple methods, this
article emphasizes the paradox between pluralism and liberalism.15 This paradox is at
the center of philosophical and legal debates about the special status of Native Nations in
the United States. It is a paradox that, I argue, will likely activate either court or public
opinion. Furthermore, this elemental debate will likely play a crucial role in framing
arguments both for and against a future movement to change the legal and political status
of Native Nations. This paper dissects the financial crisis' potential to inspire criticisms
of tribes for playing by a different, and more generous, set of rules, as well as the
financial crisis' potential to precipitate calls for policy shifts in the treatment of Native
Nations.16 The tension in the status quo, and thus the specific inspiration for such a
change, may be financiers' growing losses and lack of redress after backing Indian
gaming operations. This article also identifies another potential source for policy change:
pre-existing anti-Indian and anti-"special rights" social movements. Already present antiIndian casino social movements may generate greater outrage that standard default rules
do not apply to American Indian tribal businesses.
To clarify, in the midst of such intense and charged issues, my intent is not to make
a normative argument that financiers have legitimate claims; instead, I argue that
11. Id
12. KEVIN BRUYNEEL, THE THIRD SPACE OF SOVEREIGNTY xvi-xvii (2007).

13. Id. at xvii.
14. Id
15. More nuanced definitions will follow, but I use liberalism in the sense that there is a commitment to a
shared and universal good that takes the form of protecting universal goods. By pluralism, I mean the value of
cultural diversity, distinctness, and multiple goods that demand some variation from one universal good
espoused by liberalism. The lexicon used to describe American Indian tensions within these two is slightly
different. Scholars might juxtapose liberalismagainst the sovereignty or self-determination of tribes. This paper
will more often use liberalism versus pluralism as it is most widely identified in the debate. One of the more
well-known scholars on this subject, and whose works are cited often, is Will Kylmicka. See WILL KYMLICKA,
LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY, AND CULTURE 135-57 (1989). See generally WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL
CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS (1995).
16. See generally JEFFERY DUDAS, THE CULTIVATION OF RESENTMENT: TREATY RIGHTS AND THE NEW

RIGHT (2008) (discussing resentment and the activation of right leaning social movements against tribal
sovereignty and tribes' special rights).
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conservative social movements might use tribal sovereign status as a point of criticism in
these situations.
As suggested at the start of this essay, tribal relationships with state, federal, and
colonial governments have rarely remained consistent since their inception. 17 Major
events, and even events that initially seemed limited, have had the tendency to precipitate
significant changes in the relationship between tribal and non-tribal governments. An
event as small and singular as a "case" carries the potential to alter the policy between
nations or entire peoples. The nature of the common law system allows for this bottomup versus top-down dialectic. As a supplemental question to that of defaults' effects on
public opinion, I examine an event's ability to structure and re-structure American Indian
political relationships through law or public opinion in this paper.
In accord with the nature of American Indian law, individual cases might embed
tenuous theoretical concerns about national identity and political ideology. Cases
involving American Indians tend to involve broader political concerns such as state
power, equal protection, and individual liberties. In the case of the 2008 financial crisis
and its ongoing effects, including tribal defaults, one should also consider these trends
within the literature on liberalism and pluralism in addition to financial regulation or
contract theory. The 2008 global financial crisis that caused or hastened tribal debt
defaults may not be comparable initially with the emotive and broader debates associated
with liberalism and pluralism. The dramatic debates in jurisprudence around due
process, habeas corpus, or equal protection as applied to tribal communities do not arise
easily in relation to the recent tribal defaults; tribal defaults are not identifiable civil
liberty concerns that prompt high judicial review and, therefore, will not be covered by
such literature. However, many of these same issues - those "charging" the public's
opinions on American Indian "special rights," "illiberalism," or "sovereign
distinctness" 19 - may arise in the issues surrounding tribal defaults. Furthermore, the
history of congressional activism, when court decisions seemingly exclude American
Indian nations from what are understood as universal obligations, also plays a role in this
discussion.
In addition to the relationship between indigenous communities and the United
States having a complicated policy history checkered by inconsistency, the relationship
also evokes multiple, intricate social commitments that extend into fundamental
paradoxes of modern and liberal social order.20 Liberalism and pluralism lie at the center
of modern political credos, but work in conflicting ways as they pertain to tribes
comprised of individuals who are simultaneously both tribal members and American
citizens.21 One consideration is the liberal commitment to universal liberties and

17. For a summary and clear analysis of the changing role of the judiciary in Indian country, see DAVID
WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (1997), which convincingly claims

both that court decisions have been inconsistent and that the way the court injects itself into Indian Country has
not been a constant in American history.
18. Id. at 186-234.
19. See DUDAS, supranote 16.

20. Angela R. Riley, (Tribal)Sovereignty and 1liberalism, 95 CALIF. L. REv. 799, 800 (2007).
21. Id.
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equality.22 The idea that "no one" shall possess greater rights than another embodies the
element of universality.23 Despite this, a commitment to the sovereignty of Native
Nations fits within - although it was not caused by - conceptions of pluralism and the
value of cultural diversity.24
The case Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez evidences (and recognizes) this
pluralistic tendency; it acknowledged, "Indian tribes are 'distinct, independent political
communities, retaining their original natural rights' in matters of local selfgovernment."25 Perhaps philosopher John Rawls characterized the paradox best, albeit
abstractly:
A crucial assumption of liberalism is that equal citizens have different and
indeed incommensurable and irreconcilable conceptions of the good . . . . [and

that Liberalism] tries to show both that a plurality of conceptions of the good
is desirable and how a regime of liberty can accommodate this plurality as to
achieve the many benefits of human diversity. 2 6
This dual commitment, that of pluralism to diversity and liberalism to universal
protection, manifests both in the desire to allow tribes to govern according to their own
preferences and the need to protect the liberties of United States citizens who are within
tribal jurisdiction. 27 Legal scholar Angela Riley contends that, regarding sovereignty and
liberalism, Rawls' description of this paradox remains intact: "Indian tribes are both
symptom and solution within this [Rawls'] philosophical debate." 2 8
In order to highlight the possible implications debt defaults may have for Native
Nations because of their unique statuses, this essay presents four sections. The first
provides background on the increase in tribal debt defaults and how those debts are being
restructured. The second section outlines the major theoretical concerns of liberalism and
pluralism and how tribal "special rights" amplify those concerns. The next section
presents an anthology of previous Supreme Court cases that make intellectual contact
with liberalism and pluralism to varying degrees. Finally, the conclusion focuses on how
the "newness" of defaults hearkens back to the unique nature of Indian law and policy in
the United States.
GROWING DEFAULTS AND DEBT CRISIS IN INDIAN COUNTRY

The complicated status of American Indians in the American political arena has
spawned significant literature on a broad range of subjects from violence to gender
equality to fishing rights.29 Because of how recent these tribal business defaults are,
22. See id. at 800, 804.
23. Id. at 800.
24. Id. at 847-48.
25. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55 (1978) (citing Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (1 Pet.)
515, 559 (1832)).
26. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 303-04 (expanded ed., 2005).

27. Riley, supra note 20, at 799.
28. Id. at 3. See RAWLS, supranote 26, at 303-04.
29. For sovereignty and jurisdiction over outsiders that tribes have or lack, see DUDAS, supra note 16, at 45,
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combined with the historical lack of private investment in Indian Country until the last
twenty years, legal scholars have not had the opportunity to significantly explore how
these communities handle financial redress. However, defaults are likely to grow as a
financial, political, legal, and possibly public opinion issue, given that, by 2010, the
national Indian casino debt stood at twenty billion dollars. 30
The global financial crisis, the catalyst of which is widely believed to be the
collapse of the Lehman Brothers investment bank in the fall of 2008,31 has led to the
most severe recession since the end of World War 11.32 As unemployment rose and net
worth dropped, discretionary income became less available for most Americans. 33
Holiday and vacation spending steeply declined. 34 The sharp decline in discretionary
spending left American Indian tribes, who had invested heavily in the resort business
over the previous decade, highly vulnerable. 35 Casino-resort revenue fell drastically,
leaving many tribes with gaming and resort investments unable to keep up with interest
and capital payments on these loans. 36 In August 2011, the Foxwoods Casino and
Resort, the largest casino in the United States and the centerpiece of the Mashantucket
Pequot Tribal Nation's economic development over the last two decades, defaulted on
more than two billion dollars of debt. 37 At the time, the Mohegan Sun, one of the largest
Indian gaming facilities (located, along with Foxwoods, in Connecticut), as of August
2011, hovered near default and was attempting to restructure its debt, 38 which is not as
sizable as the Mashantucket's. 39 In an attempt to restructure delinquent loans, tribes in
other states, such as Michigan and New Mexico, have engaged in yearlong "standoffs" 40
with creditors.

60-65, 70-72 (discussing fishing rights in the Great Lakes). See also ANDREA SMITH, CONQUEST: SEXUAL
VIOLENCE AND AMERICAN INDIAN GENOCIDE 27-33 (2005) (investigating the high rates of sexual violence
against Native American women).
30. Alexandra Berzon & Mike Spector, Taking a Hit at Indian Casino: Sovereignty Rules Hamstring
Restructuring When Tribes Default on Bonds, WALL ST. J., Dec. 9, 2010, at CI-C2.
31. Andrew Ross Sorkin, Lehman Files for Bankruptcy; Merill Is Sold, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2008,
available at www.nytimes.com/2008/09/15/business/15lehman.html?pagewanted=all.
32. Emily Kaiser, Economists See Longest Recession Since World War Tiwo, REUTERS (January 10, 2009,
12:35 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/01/10/us-usa-economy-forecast-idUSTRE5090QL200901 10.
33. Jonathan McCarthy, DiscretionaryServices Expenditures in This Business Cycle, LIBERTY STREET
ECONOMICS (July 06, 2011, 10:00 AM), http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2011/07/discretionaryservices-expenditures-in-this-business-cycle.html (analyzing figures from the U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis, National Bureau of Economic Research). This data shows there was a 7% drop in discretionary
spending, which was the largest since World War II.
34. See id.
35. Mike Spector, Foxivoods Debt Talks Test Tribal Bets: Pequot Casino Seeks Big Lender Haircut;
Sovereign Default?, WALL ST. J., July 2, 2011, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748
704525704575341310022442270.htm (discussing the financial crisis of several tribes after making large
investments in the last decade).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Berzon & Spector, supra note 30, at C2; see Mohegan Sun casinofails to refinance $811M debt, LAS
VEGAS REV. J. (Dec. 31, 2011, 2:02 AM), http://www.Ivrj.com/business/mohegan-sun-casino-fails-torefinance-811m-debt-136471243.html (showing that the Mohegan Sun faced around $811 million dollars in
debt in 2011).
39. Id.
40. Berzon & Spector, supranote 30, at CL.
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According to observers, these defaults carry relatively fewer consequences than in
cases where these businesses are not owned by a tribe. 4 1 Popular newspapers - in this
case, the Wall Street Journal- generally present tribes as not being required to adhere
to the same default rules as non-natives: "[n]ormal restructuring rules don't apply to
Indian casinos. Laws on Indian sovereignty mean creditors aren't able to seize assets or
take ownership stakes in the gambling enterprises after defaults." 42 Trust status limits
not only the degree of ownership in Indian Country, but also who might hold what
limited title does exist. This means the distinctness found in sovereignty exposes
American Indian tribes into what political scientist Jeffery Dudas calls the American
political right's criticism of "special-rights." 4 3 According to Dudas, such conservative
social movements have mobilized sporadically over the last 30 years to work against
American Indian treaty rights.44 Criticisms stem from tribes' greater access to fishing
grounds,45 their ability to harvest certain natural resources that others cannot,46 or their
building of casinos. 47 Most anti-treaty groups, label American Indian tribal status and the
rights that go with this status as "un-American."48
Without seeming overly sympathetic to the large financial institutions that have at
times charged higher interest rates to tribal enterprises because of the risks involved with
lending to sovereign entities, 49 banks receive a comparatively low return from
restructuring tribal debts. 50 In one case, the Mescalero Apache Tribe restructured 200
million dollars of debt for 30 cents on the dollar.51 The Mescalero case is not unique in
the restrictions and terms offered by these financial institutions.52 More aggressive
attempts by creditors attempting to take management control over gaming operations (a
common provision of non-gaming finance contracts) have failed when challenged in
court. 53 In Wells Fargo Bank N.A. v. Lake of the Torches Economic Development
Corporation,54 a Wisconsin court held that outside institutions are prohibited from
seizing management control of tribal business entities even when stipulated in a contract
between tribe and financier. The trust status of tribal land prevents outside creditors (or
others) from seizing assets, unlike non-tribal contracts.

41. For an example of journalism covering the issue of default, among other stories, see id at CI-C2.
Comparing tribal business to regular business is only one interpretation. It is equally reasonable that tribal
nations ought to be compared to a national government, which operates with sovereign immunity, typically a
reserve bank, and possibly fewer consequences.
42. Berzon & Spector, supranote 30, at Cl.
43. DUDAS, supra note 16, at 42-43, 97-105.
44. Id. at 41-47.
45. Id. at 44-45.
46. Id. at 91-92.
47. Id. at 98-105.
48. DUDAS, supra note 16, at 137-38 (emphasis added).
49. Berzon & Spector, supranote 30, at C2.
50. Id. at C1.
51. Id.
52. Id. at C1-C2 (noting that the Odawa and Mohegan Tribes dealt with similar negotiations in
restructuring).
53. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Lake of the Torches Econ. Dev. Corp., 677 F.Supp. 1056, 1058, 1060-61
(W.D. Wis. 2010) (dismissing a creditor's claim that the tribe had violated a default provision in its contract
with the tribe).
54. Id. at 1060-61.
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In cases where outside financial institutions cannot find terms beneficial to them,
the pressure to minimize their liabilities increases. To my knowledge, these institutions
have not made a concerted effort to undermine tribal sovereignty or trust status. It is
possible and likely, however, that a confluence of factors might turn the tribes' "special
right" to escape asset seizure and redress by creditors into a public liability. The idea of
"special rights" as a criticism of American Indian tribes was explored by Jeffery Dudas
as being central to anti-treaty rights and Indian casino movements. Conservative social
movements, as Dudas describes them, see "America under siege from irresponsible and
corrosive politics. . . . that excoriates formerly excluded groups for claiming 'special'

rights that violate the 'equal' rights of all other Americans." 55 Although not specifically
a legal liability - the principles of sovereignty and self-determination will likely
continue to be upheld by the courts, and fiscal disagreements do not activate the same
level of judicial review as do constitutional issues - the special status or special rights
might activate anti-casino and anti-Indian groups that Dudas has identified. This could
intensify the pressure on state governments for greater concessions from tribal gaming
compacts (agreements about gaming revenue sharing between tribal and state
governments) and create a more hostile regulatory environment.
EVENTS, METHODS AND CHANGE IN INDIAN POLICY

One may wonder whether the financial crisis might set in motion a status shift in
the relationship between tribes and outside government that could alter - to a degree yet
unknown - the nearly half-century-old policy of self-determination. The complete
abandonment of self-determination as the core principle in American Indian tribal status
remains unlikely, but a change in the status quo - either by the alteration of agreements
or by an increase in hostility - remains a reasonable possibility. Far smaller events have
caused re-alignments in American Indian tribal status in the past. Typically such changes
occur by either a court decision or a successful activation of social movements and
public opinion.56 A conclusive determination as to the role that "special rights" (in this
case, financialrights) might play cannot be made at this point, but it should, nonetheless,
be keep in mind that single events have shifted federal policy relating to tribes on
multiple occasions. 5 7
The methods by which status might change are numerous enough that it is not
possible to cover them categorically. However, a starting point worth considering is that
the debate between pluralism and liberalism will frame the method or mechanism by
which policy will shift. This framing connects with a significant discomfort in
juxtaposing ethnic/culturaldiversity against liberalism's universalprinciples. In the case
of Native America, this tension might use alternative terms with the same meanings. For
instance, when emphasizing race, it could pit racial/ethnicparticularismagainst colorblindness or perhaps the melting-pot notion of American identity against ethnic
fractionalization.If using a nomenclature specific to American Indian status, this would
55.
56.
try an
57.

DUDAS, supra note 16, at xi.
See Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883) (holding that a federal district court had no jurisdiction to
Indian for murder committed against another Indian on reservation lands).
See id.
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position the rights of sovereignty and self-determination against universalism.

Political and legal theories typically use a vernacular that differs from that used by
contemporary media and social movements. Neither liberalism nor pluralism are terms
that appear in popular accounts of the debate between the two commitments. Antisovereignty groups often use the two terms "special rights" and "treaty rights." Cast even
larger, outsiders may consider "special rights" to be, put plainly, "un-American" or
against the value of "equality before the law" (i.e., that some possess more rights than
others). 58 This resentment of American Indians for exercising their "special rights" sits
well within the conservative social movement's larger set of grievances against racialbased inclusionary policies. Most recognizable of these race-based policies is affirmative
action in hiring and educational admissions. According to Dudas, affirmative action was
central to mobilizing early conservative social movements. 59
It should be noted that these debt defaults seldom involve criminal activity. Rarely
are there grounds for appealing judicial decisions based upon a violation of fundamental
or constitutional rights in tribal casino defaults; therefore, this limits the judiciary's role.
Tribal defaults and limited redress, however, held as potential to activate and exacerbate
public opinion regarding a perception of an unfair status or "special right." The belief
that courts maintain a rights disparity that leaves tribes with a distinct advantage over
other business entities fits well into the "special rights" criticism. Within these
perspectives, American Indians not only have the opportunity for casino monopolies
unlike other ethnic groups, but also the ability to evade loan-repayment. If critics of
sovereignty believe that some ethnic groups have advantages that others do not, the
opportunity is open for anti-sovereignty groups with anti-pluralism and pro-liberalism
commitments to draw attention to tribal debt defaults.
EVENTS, CASES AND PUBLIC OPINION

Since the end of the treaty-making era, the Supreme Court has often weighed in on
the liberalism versus pluralism debate as it pertains to tribes.60 A set of nineteenth and
twentieth century Court decisions attempt to clarify the boundaries between tribal
sovereignty and individual liberty. In the Court's attempt to balance these two
commitments, it set precedents supporting each side of the debate, which is not unusual
in federal Indian law. Although both legislation and court decisions support Indian
tribes' ability to exert power, they also support the demand to protect individual rights
against tribal power.
This tension spans a century of court decisions. In the Ex parte Crow Dog 6 1
decision, one finds an often-cited, early case that exemplifies both a small event causing
a significant re-alignment and the dual commitment to liberalism. Native legal scholar
Vine Deloria summarizes this particular event's background and policy shift:

58. DUDAS, supra note 16, at xii, 4.
59. Id. at 4.
60. See 25 U.S.C. § 71 (2006). Treaty-making between tribes and outside government existed right after
contact with Europeans until 1871.
61. Exparte Crow,Dog, 109 U.S. at 556.
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In 1882 the Brule Sioux medicine man Crow Dog killed Spotted Tail,
leader of the band and a chief who had counseled accommodation with
the United States. Under traditional Sioux customs the relatives of the
two men arranged for compensation for the death of Spotted Tail.
Presents were exchanged, and the families believed they had solved the
problems created by the killing. The federal attorney for Dakota
Territory was aghast at the seemingly casual manner in which the
Sioux dealt with this killing, and he soon charged Crow Dog with
murder. The case reached the Supreme Court in 1883, and the
conviction of Crow Dog by the territorial court was reversed on the
grounds that the 1868 treaty had preserved for the Sioux the right to
punish tribal members who had committed serious crimes. A great
public outcry followed the decision, and in 1885 Congress passed the
Seven Major Crimes Act, which took away major criminal jurisdiction
from Indian tribes. 62
The Court's decision upheld treaty rights (and, to a certain extent, the rights of
communities to govern themselves pluralistically, although that commitment of
pluralism was not even a deeply held value in the nineteenth century and the decision
was a function of treaty right, not belief in cultural diversity as a value). However, the
political pushback from Congress resulting from an unpopular Supreme Court decision
in Ex parte Crow Dog altered jurisdictional boundaries in Indian Country in a manner
that remains today.
Whether the dispute between Crow Dog and Spotted Tail originated in a political
gambit designed to undermine the power of chiefs or over a female interest,63 the murder
of one Sioux by another held the potential to alter jurisdiction in Indian Country. In Ex
parte Crow Dog (1883), by overturning the lower court's conviction of Crow Dog, the
Supreme Court set off a public outcry strong enough to motivate Congress to pass the
Major Crimes Act in 1885. 64 In general, the Court has treated American Indian law with
a remarkable sense of agency for itself.65 Singular events, either through court cases or
in response to court cases, as in the case of the Crow Dog murder of Spotted Tail, call for
rearrangement of the jurisdictional boundaries in Indian Country thereafter; as such, they
profoundly alter the relationship between nations. Perhaps even more surprising, the
murder spurred new policy even from an event wherein only white consciousness, not
white material interest, was harmed.
The Crow Dog case proved immensely important in establishing the rules of
jurisdiction on reservations and regulating the legitimate use of violence in these spaces.
62.

VINE DELORIA, THE NATIONS WITHIN: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY 4

(1998).
63. DEE BROWN, BURY MY HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE 420 (1970) (suggesting that there are two theories
behind Crow Dog's motivations. The first, and most accepted at that period, was a dispute over a 'love
interest.' The other interpretation is that Crow Dog believed the principal chiefs had taken too much power, in
addition to accommodating the United States government beyond what it should have).
64. Major Crimes Act, ch. 341, 23 Stat. 385 (1885) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2006)). The
crimes include murder, manslaughter, rape, assault with intent to commit murder, arson, burglary, and larceny.
65.

DAVID E. WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 3-5 (1997).
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First, the Crow Dog decision recognizes Sioux jurisdiction and that the Treaty of
Laramie established it.66 Interpreting this treaty, the Supreme Court left reservation
justice to tribal authorities. Along with other tribes with similar treaty previsions, Crow
Dog was not subject to the jurisdiction of non-Native governments. At first, the treaty
provision granting tribes criminal jurisdiction over their own lands in the Treaty of
Laramie began as a concession to the relative power of plains nations during the midnineteenth century. Later, however, the rights afforded the Sioux in the treaty began to
threaten the monopoly of violence necessary for political legitimacy. 67 As the military
threat of plains tribes diminished from that of earlier periods, having territory outside of
the federal government's jurisdiction became less desirable, and it became significantly
easier for a centralizing government to assert its power. Public opinion further aided the
desires for a monopoly on legitimate violence in the West, while at the same time the
public found Siouxan jurisprudence unpalatable.
In response to what one could conceptualize as a violation of individual liberty by
a tribal government by today's standards, the Major Crimes Act sought to apply some
uniformity to tribal responses to serious affronts to rights. Note that, at this time, Spotted
Tail may not have been a United States citizen, which could jeopardize the demand for
liberalism in this case. Even the Fourteenth Amendment, which made persons born
within the territory of the United States citizens, had a caveat that exempted American
Indians.68 Not until the American Indian Citizenship Act did Congress explicitly
enfranchise American Indians.69 The Crow Dog case is unlike defaults of gaming debt,
since gaming defaults do not predisposed to due process challenges. Though less
regulated than rights restrained by jurisprudence, public opinion has the potential to elicit
a congressional response, as the Crow Dog case and surrounding events illustrate. In
these situations, a court victory for treaty rights could quickly initiate a legislativelydriven unraveling of those rights.
The tension between tribal sovereignty and individual liberty continued unabated
into the latter twentieth century. Slightly more than eighty years after Crow Dog and the
Major Crimes Act, Congress passed the Indian Civil Right Act ("the Act") in 1968.70 In
a series of Congressional hearings, tales of multiple abuses carried out by tribal authority
against the individual liberties of American Indians filled the testimony. This hearing
occurred at the apogee of the civil rights period, with ambiguity about whether the Bill of
Rights applied to Indian reservations. In the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court
in Talton v. Mayes, a case surrounding the murder of one Cherokee by another,
concluded that tribes fell within the authority of Congress but fell outside certain

66. Ex parte Crow,Dog, 109 U.S. at 559; see generally Treaty of Fort Laramie, U.S.-Sioux or Dah-co-tahs,
Cheyennes, Arapohoes, Crows, Assinaboins, Gros-ventres, Mandans, & Arrickeras, Sept. 17, 1851, 11 Stat.

749.
67. See Charles Tilly, War Making and State Making as Organized Crime, in BRINGING THE STATE BACK
IN 169 (Peter Evans et al. eds., 1985).
68. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 2 (excluding self-governing Indian tribes from citizenship
enfranchisement).
69. Indian Citizenship Act of 1924, ch. 233, 43 Stat. 253 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b)
(2000)).
70. See generally Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03 (1968).
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constitutional provisions including the Bill of Rights. 7'
In passing this legislation, Congress hoped to ensure equal protection and due
process on reservations.72 The Act expanded federal jurisdiction over intra-tribal
disputes. It listed ten rights that a tribal authority could not legally violate, specifying:
No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall (1) make or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and to petition for a redress of
grievances; (2) violate the right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable search and
seizures, nor issue warrants, but upon probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the person or thing to be seized; (3) subject any person for the
same offense to be twice put in jeopardy; (4) compel any person in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself; (5) take any private
property for a public use without just compensation; (6) deny to any
person in a criminal proceeding the right to a speedy and public trial,
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to be
confronted with the witness against him, to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and at his own expense to have the
assistance of a counsel for his defense (except as provided in
subsection (b); (7)(A) require excessive bail, impose excessive fines,
inflict cruel and unusual punishments; (B) except as provided in
subparagraph (C), impose for conviction of any I offense any penalty
or punishment greater than imprisoment for a term of one year and a
fine of $5,000, or both; (C) subject to subsection (B), impose for
conviction of any I offense any penalty or punishment greater than
imprisonment for a term of 3 years or a fine of $15,000, or both; or (D)
impose on a person in a criminal proceeding a total penalty or
punishment greater than imprisomnent for a term of 9 years; (8) deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its laws or
deprive any person of liberty or property without due process of law;
(9) pass any bill of attainder or ex post facto law; or (10) deny to any
person accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment the right,
upon request, to a trial by jury of not less than six persons.73
Scholars tend to understand these ten protections as an attempt to extend similar
protections found in the Bill of Rights to reservation politics. This did not completely
cede sovereignty and cultural distinctness to the liberal demand of universal protection.
C.L. Stetson describes the "purpose of the Act as twofold: to protect individual Indian
citizens from infringement of their rights by tribal governments, but also to promote

71.
72.
8 AM.
73.

Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896).
C.L. Stetson, Tribal Sovereignty: Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez: Tribal Sovereignty 146 Years Later,
INDIAN L. REV. 139, 140-41, 159 (1980).
Indian Civil Rights Act § 1302(a).
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Indian self-determination."74 The Act's attempt to promote sovereignty and cultural
diversity does not readily appear, for the bill does not spell it out - it becomes apparent
only upon judicial review. Stetson might have overstated the case for sovereignty in the
Act; nonetheless, the Act acknowledged the distinctness of tribes in terms of the standard
United States governing paradigm. The Act recognizes that there are "unique, political,
cultural and economic needs of tribal governments" 75 that should be taken into account
when interpreting the constitutionality of tribal actions.
Not long after the Act's enactment in 1968, Santa Clara v. Martinez used it as
grounds to sue a tribal nation for gender discrimination.76 The Martinez Court handed
down the most significant decision about the relationship between tribal sovereignty and
individual liberty in the wake of the Indian Civil Rights Act. Julia Martinez, an enrolled
Santa Clara Pueblo woman, married a Navajo man and their marriage produced
children. 7 7 The Santa Clara Pueblo refused to extend membership to Martinez's children.
Tribal membership criteria allowed only the children of male tribal members who
married non-tribal members to be eligible for tribal membership. After attempting to
have her children enrolled, then petitioning the tribal authorities to alter the membership
criteria, Martinez sued, claiming Santa Clara's rules violated her rights under the equal
protection entitlements extended less than a decade earlier to her by the Act.
The Supreme Court decided against Martinez's claim that her Pueblo was
discriminating unconstitutionally against her and her children based on her gender. The
Supreme Court grounded the opinion in their understanding of Congressional intent in
the Act regarding tribal abuses of power against individuals. According to the Court,
Congress designed the Act to "fit the unique political, cultural, and economic needs of
tribal governments."79 Certain provisions within the Bill of Rights do not appear in the
Indian Civil Rights Act. For instance, the Act, according to the Martinez decision, "does
not prohibit the establishment of religion, nor does it require jury trials in civil cases, or
appointment of counsel for indigents in criminal cases." 80 The distinctness found in
pluralism (tribal rights) overshadowed the commitments to universal liberalism (equal
protection under the law) in the Martinez case, reinforcing that religious tradition formed
an essential core of this distinctness. The Supreme Court decision against Martinez was
not without controversy. The lack of protection and the leeway given to disregard
individual tribal member's civil rights outraged feminist and civil rights groups.
Despite this, in the Martinez case, the pressure from outside interest groups was not great
enough to prompt Congress to intervene with a bill expanding protection.
Whereas Crow Dog and Martinez, among other cases, evoke conflict over concepts
74. Stetson, supra note 72, at 144 (emphasis added).
75. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 62 (1978).
76. Id. at 51.
77.

N. BRUCE DUTHU, AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE LAW 30 (2008).

78. Id. at 31.
79. Martinez, 436 U.S. at 62.
80. Id.at 63.
81. See CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, Whose Culture? A Case Note on Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo
(1983), in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAw 63, 65-66; Carla Christofferson, Tribal

Courts' Failureto Protect Native American Women: A Reevaluation of the Indian Civil Rights Act, 101 YALE
L.J. 169, 177-80 (1991).
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of crime, civil rights, and liberties, today's financial defaults, may seem to lack the same
dramatic effect. Financial default is a central issue of the day in to public opinion in the
same way that violence in the American West was in the nineteenth century and
disenfranchisement of women was in the later twentieth century. Court battles over
resources and ethnicity tend to draw the public's opinion. And cases over resources
involving one form of arbitration or another along the lines of ethnicity have garnered
attention as far back as the 1960s. The ruling in United States v. Washington (usually
referred to as the "Boldt decision" in American Indian law after a judge in the case)
sparked one of the earliest "anti-treaty" and "anti-special rights" movements. At issue
was a treaty that granted a portion of Washington State's salmon and trout catch to the
state's tribes participating in the treaty. The Court determined that fifty percent of the
allotted fish would be allocated to those Washington State tribes that had participated in
earlier treaties speculating on fishing rights. The Boldt decision mobilized anti-Indian
fishing protests for years afterward - including street marches, hanging Boldt in effigy,
and paid newspaper advertisements equating Indian fishing rights with other violations
of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.82 In a similar vein, Native
Nations' growing debt defaults, and in particular those of reservations that might have
reaped tremendous profit in previous years are likely to garner similar and significant
resentment. The conditions are comparable to those that spawned these earlier antisovereignty or anti-special rights movements.
CONCLUSION

Protests involving the Boldt decision failed to reverse court decisions favoring
tribal fishing treaty rights. The decision did galvanize an angry population that went on
to challenge treaty rights and American Indian interests in other ways. Protesters hung
effigies of Judge Boldt and sent letters to the editors of newspapers.83 Beyond this, the
change to the regulatory framework that Boldt precipitated holds more significance for
the fortunes of American Indians in Washington State. Municipal prosecutors in the
fishing areas declined to file charges against non-Natives who poached, and state-level
agencies enacted regulations designed to be burdensome to tribes. 84 The larger political
environment of increased hostility toward Natives and the accompanying social
movements against tribes developed networks that persisted. 85
It certainly remains possible the issue of tribal debt defaults will continue largely
unnoticed. The national political climate in the United States after the global financial
crisis might be interested in issues more pressing than the twenty billion dollars owed by
those tribes with favorable default statuses. If that occurs, tribal defaults should activate
neither courts nor public opinion. Given that situation, the tension between liberalism
and pluralism at the center of the modern relationship between tribes and outside
govermnents will not be re-examined. However, it remains difficult to speculate, in one
sense, because of the newness of the phenomenon of the current fiscal intertwining
82.
83.
84.
85.

DUDAS, supra note 16, at 66-70.
Id. at 66-67.
Id. at 70-71, 84.
Id. at 93.
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between banks and tribes. In Native America's complicated history, never before has
Indian Country received such large private investment. Previously only the federal
govermnent made significant loans to tribes. This is in striking contrast to more recent
patterns of investment and degrees of debt. As a result, not only is tribal legal status
unique in the American system, as Marshall so declared, so is the current status of its
debt.
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